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Notable Governance Failures 
 
A. Introduction 
A corporation steers a delicate course, tasked with maximizing returns for its investors 
while playing within a complex web of regulation. The structural characteristics of a modern 
corporation, where a board of directors manages the company for passive shareholders, 
necessitates internal processes that provide for the stability of not only the corporation but 
also that of the capital markets in which the corporation competes. How these internal 
processes should optimally look is, at best, murky and has been the subject of endless debate. 
Corporate governance “best practices,” however, are often developed in the wake of a 
corporate scandal that rocks public trust in the capital markets. Scandals, in turn, may signal 
changing approaches to “best practices.” Additionally, given that governance concerns the 
internal processes of a corporation subject to varying governmental regulation, what 
constitutes a good corporate practice may in fact depend on a particular jurisdiction’s legal 
structure and policies. 
This paper examines two notable governance failures—the Siemens bribery scandal in 
Germany and the United States and the Enron accounting scandal in the United States—and 
compares the regulatory responses of the two jurisdictions. It starts with a discussion of the 
Siemens scandal and a survey of Germany’s relevant anti-bribery regulation in Part B. Part C 
examines the Enron scandal and the U.S. regulatory response. Finally, Part D discusses the 
differences between Germany’s and the United States’ regulatory responses to the scandals 
and the effects that they had on subsequent corporate behavior. 
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B. The Siemens Scandal 
 
I. Introduction 
Recently there was the annual shareholders’ meeting of Siemens AG 
(Jahreshauptversammlung) on the 26th of January 2016. Joe Kaeser, the current president and 
CEO of Siemens, proudly presented quite reasonable figures for the first quarter of the fiscal 
year in 2016.1 When Siemens found itself at the center of the biggest corruption case in 
German economic history 10 years previously, no one would have ever thought that Siemens 
would still be in business, let alone playing such an outstanding role nationally as well as 
internationally again. How Siemens managed to undergo this scandal and use it as a catalyst 
for the total reorganization of the firm will be discussed, among other things, in the following 
paragraphs. The aim of this paper is to point out that through a good working corporate 
governance and civil society governance, coupled with reasonable regulations and most 
importantly, a lived ethical culture in the firm, governance failures such as the one at Siemens 
can be prevented. 
After describing the bribe and corruption scandal of Siemens, which due to reasons of 
space, does not lay claim to completeness at all, this paper undertakes the task of examining 
the relationship between compliance and Corporate Governance, their legal basis and 
Siemens’s newly established compliance system. Thereafter as the main focus will be how 
corruption can be combated in the best way. For this purpose, the legal situation in Germany 
before and after the scandal will be illustrated. In the conclusion will be shown an interest in 
any suggestions for repressive and/or preventive reform measures. This is to point out that 
even though this topic is very much related to criminal law, the author of this paper is trying 
not to address that area in detail. 
 
II. The bribe and corruption scandal of Siemens (2006-2008) 
	  
1. Record 
a)  Investigations of public authorities  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hauptversammlung der Siemens AG am 26. Januar 2016, 5. 
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The Siemens corruption scandal is the biggest economic scandal in the history of the 
German Federal Republic.2 The Public Prosecution München I (Staatsanwaltschaft) originally 
initiated criminal investigations against Siemens due to an anonymous complaint, as well as 
rogatory letters from Switzerland and Italy because of the suspicion of embezzlement leading 
to the detriment of the Siemens AG (Aktiengesellschaft).3 It was alleged that approximately 
20 million EUR had been discharged out of the business area of the corporation and used for 
bribe payments.4 According to reports from the press, Siemens-employees are believed to 
have used the embezzled money to get more jobs abroad. For example, it was likely used to 
acquire the license to set up the safety system for the Olympic Games in Athens 2004.5 
Moreover, in Africa and other parts of the world, it was only possible to get orders with 
underhand payments.6 On the 15th of November 2006, 250 public officials and 23 public 
prosecutors conducted searches at the company and employees` private homes in Munich, 
Erlangen and Austria.7 In doing so, they confiscated between 200 and 300 files with current 
business documents, around 36000 files with older documents and also an enormous amount 
of material data.8 However, only later did the full extent of the scandal become apparent. In 
the final results this case reached a dimension of around a billion EUR in embezzlements: 
Peter Löscher, the chairman of the Siemens AG, announced on 8th November 2007 during 
Siemens’ yearly press conference that dubious payments in the amount of 1.3 billion EUR 
had been detected.9  
b) Investigations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Shortly after the raid by the German public authorities in the autumn of 2006, officials 
in the USA were encouraged to also begin investigating the case in 2007.10 Here might come 
up the question of whether or not that is at all possible: European companies, which are listed 
on the US-American stock exchange, are governed by the US-American securities law and 
therefore by the SEC.11 Due to the fact that Siemens has been listed since the 6th of March 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Hoeth, Siemens – wohin, 11; Henselmann/Hofmann, Accounting Fraud, 218. 
3 Pressemitteilung 04/06 der Staatsanwaltschaft München I vom 16.11.2006. 
4 Pressemitteilung 04/06 der Staatsanwaltschaft München I vom 16.11.2006. 
5 Manager-Bande verschob Millionensummen ins Ausland. 
6 Ex-Siemens-Mitarbeiter packt aus. 
7 Pressemitteilung 04/06 der Staatsanwaltschaft München I vom 16.11.2006.  
8 Pressemitteilung 05/06 der Staatsanwaltschaft München I vom 22.11.2006. 
9 Weidenfeld, in: Weidenfeld, Nützliche Aufwendungen, 211; Siemens Jahrespressekonferenz 2007. 
10 Arzt, in: Festschrift Stöckel, 15 (17-18). 
11 V. Rosen, BB 2009, 230 (230). 
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2001 on the New York stock exchange12, they could henceforth be held liable from that time 
on in the USA for corruption crimes that they were committing abroad.13   
 
 
c)  Internal corporate investigations 
The management of Siemens decided early on to conduct its own internal 
investigations along with cooperating with the one from the public authorities. For that 
purpose, on the 15th of December 2006, Siemens hired the international law firm Debevoise & 
Plimpton.14 Gerhard Cromme, the chairman of the audit committee, announced the following 
at the general business meeting on the 25th of January 2007: “The mandate for Debevoise & 
Plimpton provides a complete and independent investigation.”15 The law firm should examine 
whether there had been an infringement against anti-corruption regulations and start an 
independent evaluation of the compliance and the control system of Siemens.16 Due to the 
size of the corporation, in the accounting year of 2006 Siemens employed around 475.000 
employees and acted worldwide in 190 countries17, the dimension of this investigation was 
immense to say the least. According to Siemens the operations of Debevoise & Plimpton 
included among other things: 1750 interviews with Siemens-employees and further persons, 
800 informative discussions with employees to obtain background information, 88 million 
electronic documents, 14 million sighted documents, 38 million analyzed financial 
transactions and 10 million reviewed bank records.18 Furthermore, in October 2007, Siemens 
offered an extensive amnesty program for their current and former employees in order to 
motivate them to disclose any further possible corruption cases.19 Provided that employees 
cooperated voluntarily and completely, Siemens agreed to waive a unilateral termination of 
employment policy as well as any claims for retribution from said employees in return.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Erklärung der Siemens AG bezüglich des Abschlusses der Verfahren in München und in den USA vom 15. 
Dezember 2008, 10.  
13 Hoeth, Siemens – wohin, 33. 
14 Gebhardt/Müller-Seitz, in: Organisation und Umwelt, 39 (66). 
15 Hauptversammlung der Siemens AG am 25. Januar 2007, 3.  
16 Wolf, Der Korruptionsfall Siemens, 15; Henselmann/Hofmann, Accounting Fraud, 218. 
17 Erklärung der Siemens AG bezüglich des Abschlusses der Verfahren in München und in den USA vom 15. 
Dezember 2008, 4. 
18 Erklärung der Siemens AG bezüglich des Abschlusses der Verfahren in München und in den USA vom 15. 
Dezember 2008, 5. 
19 Wolf, Der Korruptionsfall Siemens, 16. 
20 Weidenfeld, in: Weidenfeld, Nützliche Aufwendungen, 210-211. 
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2. Fines and skimming off excess profits (Gewinnabschöpfungen) 
Siemens was able to reach an agreement with the German and American authorities in 
a timely manner. In October 2007 the district court München I (Landgericht) imposed a fine 
in the amount of 201 million EUR (1 million EUR is the highest possible fine according to § 
130 para. 3 sent. 1 OWiG21 as well as 200 million EUR by way of skimming off excess 
profits, §§ 30 para. 3 i.c.m. 17 para 4 OWiG 22 ) against the former Siemens-
telecommunication-division “Com”.23 The court reached the conclusion that a former chief 
executive bribed foreign public officials together with other persons for the purpose of 
obtaining various orders between the years of 2001 and 2004. The basis of the 
aforementioned decision was due to 77 verifiable bribery cases in Nigeria, Russia and 
Libya.24 
On the 15th of December 2008, it was announced that the proceedings against Siemens 
in Munich as well as in Washington D. C., were completed.25 The Public Prosecution 
München I issued them a fine of 395 million EUR, due to violation of the supervisory duties 
according to §§ 30, 130 OWiG.26 In the US, Siemens was found guilty of a willful breach of 
FCPA-provisions by knowingly failing to maintain a proper system of internal accounting 
controls and keeping required records.27 Siemens and three subsidiaries implicated in the 
scandal accepted a fine in the amount of 450 million USD.28 In addition, a civil proceeding by 
the SEC, which had been initiated due to violation of FCPA-provisions, culminated in fines to 
the amount of 350 million USD (skimming off excess profits).29 The damage could have been 
drastically worse if Siemens had not agreed to cooperate with the SEC.30 In total Siemens had 
to pay more than 2.6 billion USD to clear its name: 1.6 billion USD in fines and fees in 
Germany and the United States as well as 1 billion USD for their internal investigations.31 
The penalties in the end were considerably less than had been expected.32  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten, as of May 13, 2015, BGBl. I 1987, 602. 
22 Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten, as of February 19, 1987, BGBl. I 1987, 602. 
23 Siemens Ad-hoc Meldung nach § 15 WpHG, 1. 
24 Wolf, Der Korruptionsfall Siemens, 9, 13. 
25 Weidenfeld, Nützliche Aufwendungen, 216. 
26 Staatsanwaltschaft München I in dem Ordnungswidrigkeitsverfahren gegen die Siemens AG, 1. 
27 United States District Court for the district of Columbia, Department's Sentencing Memorandum, 10. 
28 United States District Court for the district of Columbia, Department's Sentencing Memorandum, 10. 
29 Weidenfeld, in: Weidenfeld, Nützliche Aufwendungen, 216. 
30 Wybitul, BB 2009, 606 (606). 
31 Henselmann/Hofmann, Accounting Fraud, 220. 
32 Gebhardt/Müller-Seitz, in: Organisation und Umwelt, 39 (67). 
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3. Individual prosecutions  
Several individual Siemens’ employees also received separate fines for their role in 
this bribery, including the former CEO, as well as the Chairman and members of the 
Supervisory and Managing Boards. They were charged by the Munich prosecutors for 
neglecting their supervisory duties.33 In addition to this, the company also sought damages 
from those employees at fault.34  These proceedings drew to a close at the end of 2009, when 
six former Siemens’ executives were ordered to pay nearly 20 million EUR in 
compensation.35 It is thought that they had knowledge of the slush funds and they had been 
warned about the company's regulatory failings but didn’t take any actions to eliminate 
them.36 The single largest individual sanction was handed to long-serving former Siemens 
chairman, Heinrich von Pierer, who was forced to pay back 5 million EUR. Through this 
payment the corruption affair has been ended for Heinrich von Pierer in Germany. That being 
said, at the end of last year legal proceedings against him and former managers at Siemens 
were initiated due to bribe payments in the context of the digitalization of the Greek telephone 
network.37 However, it is questionable whether these proceedings are even legal, since they 
might infringe upon the European legal principle “ne bis in idem”38, which forbids being 
punished twice. 
4. Reorientation of the firm 
As a result of the corruption scandal Siemens undertook extensive personnel and 
structural reorganization measures.39 For reasons of space this paper does not go into the 
individual personnel measures undertaken by Siemens; however, it is noteworthy to mention 
that several coworkers whom the public prosecution was investigating have been suspended 
or dismissed and that the governing board has been reduced in number and completely 
replaced.40 In terms of structure, Siemens renewed its entire compliance system. In the 
following paragraphs the structural renewals, in particular those concerning compliance, shall 
be examined. 
a) The relationship between Compliance and Corporate Governance  
Before pointing out the relationship/difference between compliance and Corporate 
Governance it is crucial to mention what both terms actually mean. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Wolf, Der Korruptionsfall Siemens, 13. 
34 Weidenfeld, in: Weidenfeld, Nützliche Aufwendungen, 214-215. 
35 Staatsanwalt erhebt Anklage gegen Ex-Siemens-Vorstand Ganswindt. 
36 Siemens to sue former top executives. 
37 Prozess gegen frühere Siemens-Manager in Athen beginnt. 
38 Mestmäcker/Schweitzer, in: Mestmäcker/Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, § 22, para. 69. 
39 Wolf, Der Korruptionsfall Siemens, 14. 
40 Wolf, Der Korruptionsfall Siemens, 14. 
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The term Corporate Governance cannot easily be translated41 but it can be understood 
as the following: “Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs.”42  
Compliance refers to the fulfillment of, and adherence to, legal provisions and 
regulatory standards.43 It can be understood as an internal corporate management of risk 
which aims to identify, analyze and control internal corporate risks.44 Since the revision of the 
German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) on the 14th of June 2007, the term 
“compliance” is legally defined in clause 4.1.3. GCGC as follows: “The Management Board 
ensures that all provisions of law and the enterprise’s internal policies are abided by and work 
to achieve their compliance by group companies (compliance).” 
This shows that both terms are mostly congruent and only differ through their 
respective perspectives. Corporate Governance outlines the perception of the regulators 
whereas compliance outlines the perspective of those being regulated (affected companies).45 
It should be further noted that compliance is an essential element of Corporate Governance46 
and it includes all the measures to ensure that rule-consisting Corporate Governance is 
attained. Therefore, both are mutually dependent upon one another as compliance has to be 
seen as a component to achieve the goals of Corporate Governance and visa versa. 
b) Legal basis of compliance (Germany) 
Already from the translation of the term compliance (“Einhaltung, Befolgung des 
geltenden Rechts”) it can be concluded that the applicable law is the cornerstone for all areas 
of compliance.47 Following, the individual rules which refer to compliance in some way are 
going to be highlighted. 
aa) §§ 30, 130 OWiG 
§§ 30, 130 of the so-called Administrative Offenses Act (Gesetz über 
Ordnungswidrigkeiten; abbr.: OWiG) are of central importance for compliance.48 § 130 para. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 v. Werder, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/v. Werder, Handbuch Corporate Governance, 5.  
42 Clarke, International Corporate Governance, 2; v. Werder, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/v. Werder, Handbuch 
Corporate Governance, 4-5. 
43 Meyer, CCZ 2014, 113 (113); Hauschka, in: Corporate Compliance, § 1, para. 2. 
44 Hauschka, in: Corporate Compliance, § 1, para. 4; Fuchs, in: Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, § 33, para. 3. 
45 Hauschka, in: Corporate Compliance, § 1, para. 2. 
46 Berndt/Hoppler, BB 2005, 2623 (2627). 
47 Hauschka, in: Corporate Compliance, § 1, para. 21. 
48 Moosmayer, NJW 2012, 3013 (3014); Theile/Petermann, JuS 2011, 496 (497-500). 
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1 OWiG is even known as “compliance-facts (Tatbestand)”.49 In general, § 130 OWiG causes 
administrative liability if in a corporation the management negligently or willfully omits its 
duties of supervision.50 § 30 OWiG enables the assessment of a fine against corporate bodies 
and associations of individuals provided that their representatives committed a crime or an 
administrative offense.51 The purpose of § 130 OWiG is to close threatening gaps by the 
sanctioning of enterprise related breach of duties.52 § 130 OWiG however this is not a 
mandatory rule (Pflichtnorm), but a liability rule (Haftungsnorm). 
bb) German Corporate Governance Code 
The aim of the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex; abbr.: GCGC) is on one hand to present the main features of the German 
Corporate Governance-model in a compact form, and on the other hand it is to set standards, 
additionally to the applicable law, of good and responsible management. 53  The term 
compliance is mentioned four times in the GCGC, namely in the articles 3.4, 5.2 and 5.3.2 
GCGC54, and is defined in article 4.1.3,  as “(t)he Management Board ensures that all 
provisions of law and the enterprise’s internal policies  are  abided  by  and  works  to  
achieve  their  compliance  by group  companies (compliance).”55 It should be noted though 
that the GCGC has no legal force (Gesetzeskraft) and so only contains recommendations for 
the self-commitment of corporations.56 
cc) German Stock Corporation Act 
According to § 91 para. 257 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz; 
abbr.: AktG), “the management board shall take suitable measures, in particular surveillance 
measures, to ensure that developments threatening the continuation of the company are 
detected early.”58 With regard to its wording § 91 para. 2 AktG does not state which exact 
surveillance measures (Überwachungssystem) are to be imposed.59 Some people60 take the 
view that hereby a comprehensive economic risk management is meant. The prevailing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Withus, CCZ 2011, 63 (64). 
50 Rogall, in: KK-OWiG, § 130, para. 1. 
51 Rogall, in: KK-OWiG, § 30, para. 1. 
52 Rogall, in: KK-OWiG, § 130, para. 4. 
53 V. Werder, in: Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, 1st preamble, para. 82, 83. 
54 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex in the version of May 05, 2015.  
55 German Corporate Governance Code, 6. 
56 Hauschka, in: Corporate Compliance, § 1, para. 23. 
57 Aktiengesetz, as of December 22, 2015, BGBl. I 1965, 1089. 
58 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), English translation, 40. 
59 Blasche, CCZ 2009, 62 (63). 
60 Säcker, NJW 2008, 3313 (3315); Strieder, BB 2009, 1002 (1004). 
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opinion61 though requires only an early warning and monitoring system. This prevailing 
opinion is preferable, as the demand for a comprehensive economic risk management would 
infringe upon the freedom of organization of the corporations according to Art. 1462 of the 
German constitution (Grundgesetz).63 Further, such a determination would contradict the 
management discretion (Leitungsermessen) of the board.64 The same applies to § 93 para. 1 
sent. 1 AktG, where “the members of the management board shall employ the care of a 
diligent and conscientious manager.”65 The management needs to make sure that no one is 
acting illegally in their corporation.  
dd) § 25a KWG 
§ 25a66 of the German Banking Law (Gesetz über das Kreditwesen; abbr.: KWG) 
obligates an institution to follow certain organizational duties. According to § 25a para. 1 
sent. 1 KWG, the supervising institutes must have a proper business organization which 
ensures that the relevant legal provisions are observed. It includes in particular an appropriate 
and effective management of risk.67 
ee) § 33 para. 1 WpHG i.c.w. § 25a KWG 
With the adoption of § 33 of the German Securities Trading Law 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz; abbr.: WpHG), the main features of compliance have been found 
for the first time in a legal provision.68 § 33 WpHG69 creates an obligation for investment 
service enterprises (Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen) to accomplish reasonable 
organizational structures.70 The general organizational duty was concretized on the 20th of 
July 2007 in the §§ 12, 13 of the regulation for concretization of the code of behavior and 
organizational requirements for investment service enterprises (Verordnung zur 
Konkretisierung der Verhaltensregeln und Organisationsanforderungen für 
Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen; abbr.: WpDVerOV).71  Therefore among others, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Bunting, ZIP 2012, 357 (358); Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, § 91, para. 8; Pahlke, NJW 2002, 1680 (1681-1682). 
62 Grundgesetz, as of December 23, 2014, BGBl. III 1949, 100-1. 
63 Helmrich, NZG 2011, 1252 (1253); Theusinger/Liese, NZG 2008, 289 (290). 
64 Helmrich, NZG 2011, 1252 (1253); Theusinger/Liese, NZG 2008, 289 (290). 
65 German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), English translation, 40. 
66 Kreditwesengesetz, as of November 20, 2015, BGBl. I 1998, 2776. 
67 Braun/Wolfgarten, in: Kreditwesengesetz, § 25a, para. 4. 
68 Fuchs, in: Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, § 33, para. 3; resolution and report of the financial committee, BT-
Drucks. 12/7918, 105. 
69 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, as of November 20, 2015, BGBl. I 1998, 2708. 
70 Fuchs, in: Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, § 33, para. 1. 
71 Fuchs, in: Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, § 33, para. 10. 
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responsible compliance-representative is to be appointed, of which whose tasks are described 
under § 12 para. 4 WpDVerOV72.  
c) Legal obligation for all corporations to establish a compliance-organization?  
As shown above compliance is legitimately anchored in different rules. Therefore, the 
issue arises as to whether a general legal obligation for all corporations to establish a 
compliance-organization can be derived from these rules. The view that is occasionally 
expressed in the literature is that the organizational duties (compliance-organization) are the 
result of the company law (§ 130 OWiG and some other professional rules).73 Indeed there is 
no legal obligation to establish a compliance-organization for all corporations, but this 
obligation can be derived out of the above-mentioned rules by way of analogy (Analogie).74 
This view seems not to be persuasive. An analog application (analoge Anwendung) requires 
an unintended gap in the law (planwidrige Regelungslücke) as well as a comparable situation 
of interests (vergleichbare Interessenlage).75 For this reason, an analog application fails 
because there is no comparable situation of interests for all corporations.76 It does not appear 
appropriate if corporations with very few employees, and so with a different complexity of 
their requirements, are forced to establish a compliance-organization.77 Such a high and costly 
“burden” would hinder their daily business and/or even threaten their existence. For this 
reason, a legal obligation for all corporations to establish a compliance-organization does not 
exist under German law.  
Nevertheless there are situations where there is a legal obligation to establish a 
compliance-organization for German corporations, namely if they are listed on the American 
stock exchange (like Siemens) and thus governed additionally by the US-American 
regulations.78 This means that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is applicable and therefore there 
is the legal duty to establish a compliance-organization.79 For instance, referring to section 
404 SOX, the management is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of an 
appropriate internal control system. Further, the FCPA obligates firms to have an efficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Verordnung zur Konkretisierung der Verhaltensregeln und Organisationsanforderungen für 
Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen, as of November 20, 2015, BGBl. I 2007, 1432.  
73 Schneider, ZIP 2003, 645 (648-649). 
74 Schneider, ZIP 2003, 645 (649). 
75 Rauhut, JuS 2009, 289 (297). 
76 Hauschka, ZIP 2004, 877 (878). 
77 Hauschka, ZIP 2004, 877 (878); Fleischer, NZG 2014, 321 (329). 
78 See B. I. 2). 
79 Hülsberg/Kühn, in: Compliance, Aufbau – Management – Risikobereiche, 6, para. 230. 
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compliance system.80 This however, is not the case anymore for Siemens, as it was delisted 
from the American Stock exchange on the 16th of May 2014.81 
d) The compliance system of Siemens  
Now, having seen what compliance stands for and where it is derived from, the 
compliance system of Siemens itself shall be discussed. The present compliance system of 
Siemens originated in the years 2007 and 2008, in response to the criminal investigations of 
the public prosecution Munich, the SEC and the US Department of Justice.82 The compliance 
organization of Siemens is now considered exemplary.83 At the “core”84 of the Siemens 
compliance program are the Business Conduct Guidelines (Code of Conduct) which came 
into force on the 18th of July 200185 and were adopted in a revised form in January 2009.86 
They contain the central compliance regulations (Verhaltensvorgaben)87 and are binding for 
all their employees worldwide.88 Further, they include rules about precise requirements for 
complying with competition law and anti-corruption law, for handling donations, for avoiding 
conflict of interests, for prohibition of insider trading and for protecting company assets.89 
The compliance system is based on the three pillars, “Prevent”, “Detect” and “Respond”.90 
The action level “Prevent” consists of the “Compliance Helpdesk “Ask Us””, a contact point 
for all questions in regard to the theme of compliance.91 The informants-system “Tell Us” is 
an element of the next pillar “Detect” and offers employees and other stakeholders of the 
enterprise an anonymous way to report compliance infringements.92 They can even refer to 
the external ombudsman of the enterprise.93 The sanctioning of compliance-infringements and 
the company-wide case trackings are the supporting elements of the third pillar “Respond”.94 
For this purpose the Corporate Disciplinary Committee (CDC) was established, which 
assesses wrongdoings of members of the management and makes binding recommendations.95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Partsch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act der USA, 40. 
81 Delisting New York Stock Exchange, 1. 
82 Moosmayer, Compliance, para. 362. 
83 Siemens hat aus Schmiergeldskandal Lehren gezogen. 
84 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 64. 
85 United States District Court for the district of Columbia, Statement of offense, 10. 
86 Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines, Januar 2009, 1. 
87 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 64. 
88 Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines, Januar 2009, 3. 
89 Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines, Januar 2009.  
90 Compliance Bericht Siemens 2014, 138. 
91 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 66. 
92 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 68. 
93 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 68. 
94 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 69-70. 
95 Pohlmann/Moosmayer, in: Stober, Korruptionsprävention als Herausforderung, 69. 
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5. Interim conclusion 
Having got a broad insight into the scandal and its aftermath with the enormous 
settlement paid by Siemens, two points have become notable. Firstly, even if it has been the 
biggest German corruption case in history, the corporation itself received no criminal 
prosecution and has just been fined instead. Secondly, the extensive and efficient 
collaboration of the entire Siemens workforce, coupled with the creation of the current 
established compliance system, made it possible that the scandal could be solved in a 
relatively expedient amount of time. However, the question, “How could such a scandal 
happen?” is still not answered yet. The following pages will give a more substantial answer to 
this question.  
 
III. Combating of corruption  
The containment of corruption can only succeed if a broad consensus in the society exists 
about the detriment of corruption, and if within the public opinion lies the desire to proceed 
against it. Nevertheless, for the combating of corruption legal regulations are indispensable in 
serving to punish those who gain an advantage by the use of it.  
1. What does corruption mean? 
Corruption can be defined from a social as well as legal point of view. Although there is 
no uniform term for corruption, it can be seen ethically and morally as behavior in which 
individuals with public or private tasks gain improper and unfair benefits at the cost of the 
general public.96 Within the German criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch; abbr.: StGB) the term 
corruption is not explicitly used.97 Under corruption, in a narrower criminal law sense is to be 
understood as, among others, the bribery (Bestechlichkeit) and corruption (Bestechung) in 
commercial practice according to §§ 299, 300 StGB98.99 
2. Legal situation in Germany  
In order to see how the rules/regulations for combating corruption have been 
developing, it is worth looking at the legal (mainly criminal) situation in Germany before and 
after the scandal. 
Since mid-1995 corruption has been proscribed not only internationally, but also 
increasingly nationally. 100  By decreeing the law on the fight against corruption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Bannenberg, in: Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, chapter 12, para. 4. 
97 Bannenberg, in: Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, chapter 12, para. 5. 
98 Strafgesetzbuch, as of December 10, 2015, BGBl. I 1998, 3322. 
99 Bannenberg, in: Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, chapter 12, para. 5. 
100 Transparency International Deutschland, Nationaler Integritätsbericht Deutschland, Januar 2012, 24. 
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(Korruptionsbekämpfungsgesetz) in 1997, the criminal offenses, among others, for granting 
and accepting an advantage (Vorteilsannahme und -gewährung) with regard to officials (§§ 
331, 333 StGB), have been aggravated.101 With this important modification of the penal 
provisions against corruption, a change in the public’s perception took place.102 Even the laws 
against the bribery of foreign officials for the acquisition of public orders have been 
substantially strengthened. Prior to this change, at the national level it was still usual practice 
to punish only the bribery of Germany’s own (national) officials; whereas the bribery of 
foreign officials was common practice and used as a legitimate means to acquire public orders 
abroad.103 Case in point; bribes abroad were tax-deductible in Germany until 1998.104 In this 
regard, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the USA is an exception, which already 
punished the bribery of foreign officials since 1977.105 US-driven efforts to reach that level of 
protection worldwide led to the OECD-Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions of 1997.106 The convention came into force 
on the 2nd of February 1999107, and was implemented in Germany through the law on 
combating international corruption (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung internationaler Bestechung; 
abbr.: IntBestG). 108  In addition, for the implementation of European and international 
guidelines, Germany legislated the EU Bribery Act (EU-Bestechungsgesetz; abbr.: EUBestG) 
in the year 1998.109 On the 22nd of August 2002110 the third paragraph of § 299 StGB was 
inserted into the aforementioned Act, with the result that by law the prohibition of bribery and 
corruption was extended to the entire foreign competition.111 Nevertheless there have been 
some anti-corruption conventions which Germany has signed, but not ratified and 
implemented.112 Even the draft of a criminal law amendment act 113 for increasing the 
corruption criminal law, which was presented in the Bundestag on the 4th of October 2007, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption, as of August 13, 1997, BGBl. I 1997, 2039. 
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has never been passed.114 All in all the German criminal code, referring to corruption, made 
due to the implementation of strong differentiating international minimum requirements an 
increasingly unsystematic impression (especially for crimes with a foreign dimension).115 Last 
year though, on the 26th of November 2015116, the law on combating corruption came into 
force and substantially changed the corruption criminal law. 117  In particular the new 
amendment in § 299 StGB states that not only the unfair preference in competition (unlautere 
Bevorzugung im Wettbewerb) is punishable, but also the simple infringement towards the 
principal (Geschäfstherr). Thus criminal liability loopholes (Strafbarkeitslücken) have been 
closed, but there is still some critique about the principal’s model (Geschäftsherrenmodell).118 
Overall though, the legal situation over the past 20 years has been changed noticeably in the 
right direction. However, no regulatory change to German law has been implemented as a 
direct result of the Siemens scandal. The current situation is the result of a gradual process of 
reforms. 
3. Reform measures – repressive or preventive?  
Having seen the legal situation, especially from the criminal law side, the question of how 
corruption can be combated in the best and most effective way arises. Is it best combated in a 
repressive or in a preventive manner? Can the situation be improved through some reform 
measures? In the following paragraphs the aforementioned questions will be addressed.  
a) Repressive Measures 
aa) Implementation of a corporate criminal law? 
This discussion started in November 2013, with the draft of the implementation of a 
corporate criminal law.119 Under the German criminal code only natural persons (and so no 
corporations) can be punished even if they are acting on behalf of a corporation.120 A 
sanctioning of corporations for employees’ wrongdoings happens through a fine according to 
§ 30 OWiG – as seen in the Siemens case.121 One of the proponents’ reasons to implement a 
corporate criminal law is the fact that the prosecution of administrative offenses underlies the 
principle of appropriateness (Opportunitätsgrundsatz). This means that there is no duty for the 
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authorities, like in the criminal proceedings (§ 152 para. 2 StPO122), to prosecute.123 Another 
is that the OWiG does not promote compliance efforts for the corporations.124 Further 
corruption should be seen not only as an administrative offense, but as a crime125, and 
therefore “real penalties” should be introduced. Critical voices argue that sufficient possible 
sanctions already exist;126 for example, in the year 2013, § 30 OWiG127 was modified that 
from now on, a fine of 10 million EUR could be imposed.128 Also, the maximum fine can be 
extended in cases of skimming off excess profits.129 So corporations do get a reasonable fine 
according to their wrongdoing. Additionally, an implementation of a corporate criminal law 
would contradict the principle of guilt which is only possible relating to natural persons.130 
Thus it does not seem to be necessary to implement a corporate criminal law since corruption 
can be combated just as effectively with the (possibly adapted) OWiG. Criminal regulations 
should stay the “ultima ratio”. 
bb) Corruption register? 
Currently the implementation of a nationwide corruption register is planned. The aim 
of this register is to basically sanction corporations which have violated laws.131 Under this 
register corrupt corporations, if found guilty, will be excluded for some time from the 
awarding of public or other contracts.132 Though this could prove to be problematic, as with 
such a penalty corporations will find it very hard to keep their business alive whilst they are 
banned from being awarded contracts. Taking into account the Siemens scandal it can be 
concluded that had there been a corruption register, it would have been almost impossible for 
the firm to find its way back to its former strength as it did. Thus it is crucial that the register, 
if it is going to be implemented, provides some special limits, to include the following:133 
Firstly, it should include a reasonable time period for the length of exclusion, which should be 
in relation to the economic benefit the illegally firm took. Secondly, the point of who has 
access to the register is to be clarified. Information regarding the mere suspicion of a 
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corporation being corrupt should not be accessible to the public. This would namely lead to a 
maybe unjustified effect of pillory for the respective corporation. Thirdly, it should provide 
for the possibility of an early deletion if the firm is doing “self-cleaning” (compliance). 
b) Preventive Measures 
aa) The role of Corporate Governance in preventing corruption  
(Good) Corporate Governance can even make a contribution towards preventing 
corruption.134 “Good Corporate Governance” means having principles such as transparency 
and accountability at the decision-making level of the firm,135 as well as a compliance 
system136. The German independent corporate board137 represents the shareholders’ interests 
which can help in preventing the (sometimes) opportunistic behaviors of the managers.138 
Having integral and transparent corporate boards makes it definitely more enticing for 
managers to commit to a “no bribe” policy when dealing with public officials who request 
support with regards to outstanding payments (bribe payments). Further, knowing where the 
decision comes from and how it is reached (Transparency) underlies the very roots of 
corporate governance.139 This transparent system makes bribery in general much harder. Next 
to good working transparency and accountability, strong codes of business ethics can also 
guide the behavior of board members, managers and employees and in so doing help to 
prevent corruption.140 In short, good Corporate Governance embodies a company’s ethical 
values in all decisions and operations. Further, as previously mentioned, compliance stands 
for a core element of corporate governance and provides an important anti-corruption system. 
That being said, compliance does of course not only bring advantages, it too has its points of 
criticism. For instance, opponents criticize the lack of implementation of compliance in the 
firms,141 as well as its rather high costs.  
All of the aforementioned principles are almost useless though if they are not “actively 
lived” by all coworkers from “the tone at the top” which sets the moral tones on behalf of the 
corporation from the “top” to the “bottom”. All in all, the checks and balance system of 
corporate governance is playing a crucial role in preventing corruption.  
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bb) Other suggestions  
Thinking of other measures to prevent corruption, it could be suggested to “reward” 
corporations which are acting without the use of any corruption. This could be realized for 
instance through tax reliefs, the offer of premiums for corporations and/or the introduction of 
not profit-orientated remuneration systems. Instead of strictly punishing a corrupt corporation, 
it could be wiser to combat the causes of corruption and not simply sanction it after the 
corruption has occurred. If the above idea was implemented it would then be “easier” for a 
corporation not to accept bribe offers; and on the contrary, the corporation could report the 
offeror, whereby getting in return a premium. A further recommendation could be seen in the 
mitigation or exemption of the fine if the respective corporation makes a voluntary 
declaration. Such an implementation is already discussed as an amendment of § 30 OWiG.142  
Another approach could possibly be moving the current German two-tier board 
structure, which consists of a management board and a supervisory board143, to come closer to 
the American one-tier system. Reasoning for this proposal includes but is not limited to the 
fact that due to the separation of the German two-tier system, the supervisory board, which is 
responsible for preventing corruption in a corporation, seems to be less informed144 than it 
would be under a one-tier system. Consequently, if the change was made, then in theory the 
supervisory board would be more informed and so could play a better role in controlling the 
management boards and in so doing could better prevent possible corruption cases. That being 
said this would also lead to a greater independency of the management whence again, as 
history shows us, increases the risk of corruption. Looking at former American governance 
scandals, their one-tier system proved just that. Thus, coming closer to the American two-tier 
system would not automatically bring an end to the failure of businesses to combat 
corruption.  
c) Statement  
Combating corruption is an ongoing and continuous effort. It requires both repressive as 
well as preventive measures. However, as mentioned above, it is not necessary to implement a 
corporate criminal law. The OWiG already provides good working tools to combat 
corruption, though it could be amended in terms of extending § 30 OWiG in such a way to 
provide better incentives (mitigation of the fine) for firms to establish a compliance system. It 
can be further noted that a corruption register is a good step in the right direction, as long as it 
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is used in an appropriate way, related to the respective corporation, and not seen as the sole 
and exclusive solution for corruption cases. A more efficient method for the firm as well as 
the economy, is to monitor corporations which attract attention through corrupt behavior. 
Compliance too can play a very decisive role in combating corruption since it notably 
provides a system of regulated self-regulation. That all being stated, completely controlling 
corporations is also not the ideal way to combat corruption. This would mostly hinder 
corporations in their flexibility and transparency. However, there could be implemented the 
duty to establish a compliance system for only the “bigger”, in terms of their revenues, 
corporations. Measures such as offering premiums or tax reliefs, could also play a role in 
changing the corporations’ awareness concerning corruption. The mentality that nowadays 
successful businesses are able to run without using corruption needs to arise throughout the 
corporate world. Therefore, it is crucial that the activity orientation and the norms are 
internalized and lived by the entire corporation. Overall, the best and most efficient way to 
combat corruption can be reached through the combination of repressive and preventive 
measures, but with a major focus on preventive methods. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Coming back to the former question, “How could such a scandal happen?”, it can be 
concluded that many factors played a decisive role in this damaging bribery scandal. One 
factor was the change in the legal situation, particularly in regards to the bribery of foreign 
officials. Previous to the scandal Siemens was not deterred by the changes to German law and 
so carried on regardless, bribing foreign officials. These bribes stemmed from other problems 
concerning this notable failure, namely the rather bad Corporate Governance of Siemens in 
terms of accountability and transparency as well as its lack of use of the Code of Conduct in 
practice. Last but not least, due to the enormous responsibility and pressure Siemens had 
regarding their employees, “it was about keeping the business unit alive and not jeopardizing 
thousands of jobs overnight.”145 Peter Löscher, a former chief executive of Siemens, said in 
July 2007 that instilling an ethical corporate culture "is a marathon for us, not a sprint. The 
important thing for us is that compliance becomes part of management culture internationally, 
from top to bottom and back again."146 All the more surprising is that what he said actually 
came true as Siemens established throughout this scandal an exemplary working compliance 
system, and has used the crisis as a new start, necessarily combined with a good Corporate 
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Governance. If this Siemens case brought about anything good, it is that it has moved the 
problems of corporate corruption from obscurity and into the public awareness. The 
businesses, the government and civil society would as a whole do well to work together and 
in doing so reduce the risk of any further cases of corruption. 
Insofar as it remains to be seen how Volkswagen will deal with its emissions scandal, 
and if they can also use it, as Siemens did their scandal, to restructure their current Corporate 
Governance system into a good working Corporate Governance. 
 
 
 
 
C. The Enron Scandal 
The fall of Enron in the early 2000s not only bankrupted a major New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) listed corporation and brought down one of the “Big Five” accounting 
firms but also marked a major shift in how the United States and Corporate America values 
corporate governance. The scandal’s fallout spanned over ten years, resulting in the criminal 
indictments and convictions of Enron’s corporate officers and its accounting firm, Arthur 
Andersen, and the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  
I. Enron’s Plummet from Grace 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Texas-based Enron Corporation expanded its traditional 
business (transmitting and distributing electricity and natural gas in the United States) to 
include a marketplace for commodities (including energy, broadband communications, pulp 
and paper) and risk management services. The expansion allowed Enron to operate a virtual 
marketplace for buyers, sellers and transporters to enter transactions. Given the frequent 
short-term price fluctuations in the commodities markets, Enron also offered risk management 
services to its market users by buying and selling derivatives of those commodities 
transactions. So exciting and seemingly successful were these expansions, that Fortune 
magazine labeled Enron one of the most innovative companies in the world in December 
2000.147 By December 2001, however, the company had entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history at that time.148 
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Enron’s plummet from grace began on October 16, 2001, when the company 
announced a $544 million charge against earnings related to transactions with a partnership 
created and managed by Andrew Fastow, Enron’s CFO, and a corresponding $1.2 billion 
reduction in shareholders’ equity related to those transactions. While such an announcement 
might not have devastated the company on its own, within a month, Enron’s prospects 
plunged into free fall when it announced that it was restating financial statements from 1997 
through 2001 because of accounting errors that had been made with respect to transactions 
with other partnerships managed by Enron employees (including Fastow). These accounting 
errors had resulted in gross overstatements of Enron’s reported net income (e.g. by $248 
million out of a total $893 million in 1999)149 and reported shareholder equity and large 
understatements of the company’s reported debt. Enron also disclosed in its announcement 
that Fastow had received over $30 million from transactions between his partnerships and the 
company. 150  These announcements destroyed the market’s confidence in the company, 
sending it into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and prompted investigations by the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 2001 and U.S. Department of Justice in 2002.151 
In the wake of the company’s bankruptcy, a number of key executives were 
prosecuted by the Justice Department on charges including conspiracy, insider training, fraud 
and money laundering. For instance, Fastow pled guilty to conspiracy to commit securities 
and wire fraud and admitted that had conspired to manipulate Enron’s public financial reports 
and enriched himself.152 Enron founder and CEO Kenneth Lay was convicted of conspiracy, 
wire fraud and securities fraud, while Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling was convicted of 
conspiracy, wire fraud, insider trading and making false statements to auditors.153 Fastow and 
Skilling ultimately served or are serving time in federal prison;154 Lay passed away before he 
could be sentenced.155 
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II. Creative Accounting 
While theories have been advanced about what led to Enron’s ultimate downfall, 
including that Enron had bet wrongly on the market156 and failed to accurately hedge against 
risk taken on by its derivatives trading, it can be universally agreed upon that Enron engaged 
in creative accounting that cast a glossy sheen on numbers disclosed to investors and engaged 
in self dealing transactions. 
According to a report by a Special Investigative Committee commissioned by the 
Board of Directors (hereinafter, “Powers Report”), Enron had entered financial transactions 
that were designed to keep assets and liabilities off its balance sheet and maintain the 
company’s credit rating rather than bona fide economic objectives.157 These transactions often 
involved accounting structures called special purpose entities (“SPEs”) and with the blessing 
of Enron’s accountant, Arthur Andersen. 158  Under accounting rules, a company must 
consolidate its financials with any companies in which it is the majority shareholder. When a 
company transacts with an SPE, however, it can treat the SPE’s financials as an independent 
outside entity when (1) at least 3% of the SPE’s total capital comes from outside equity 
investors, and that 3% remains at risk throughout the transaction; and (2) the independent 
owner of the SPE controls the SPE.159 If those conditions are met, the company may record 
the profits and gains from transactions with the SPE but exclude the SPE’s assets and 
liabilities from its balance sheet. Taking advantage of this accounting structure, Enron’s 
managers entered into a number of questionable transactions with SPEs that set up the 
company for its downfall. 
1.Chewco Transaction 
One such questionable transaction, involving an entity named Chewco Investments 
L.P. (“Chewco”), gives a sampling of the type of accounting and oversight errors that made 
up Enron’s problems. 
According to the Powers Report, Enron was party to a joint venture with the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) called Joint Energy 
Development Investment Limited Partnership (“JEDI”) between 1993 and 1996.160 Because 
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JEDI was a joint venture, Enron could record its gains and losses from JEDI on its income 
statements but did not have to report JEDI’s liabilities.161 In 1997, Enron redeemed CalPERS’ 
interest in JEDI so that CalPERS could invest in an unrelated Enron partnership.162 To 
prevent consolidation of JEDI (particularly its debts) into the company’s financial records, 
however, Enron needed a new partner for JEDI. Rather than finding a legitimate outside 
partner, Enron set up a limited partnership managed by Michael J. Kopper, an Enron Global 
Finance employee who reported to Fastow, the CFO.163 As noted in Section C.II above, the 
financials of an SPE can be left unconsolidated from the related company it transacts with if 
and only if an independent investor owns at least 3% of the SPE’s total equity and controls 
the SPE. When Chewco and Enron could not locate any outside equity investors, they instead 
structured Chewco’s purchase of CalPERS’ JEDI interest using debt rather than equity.164 
Without the outside equity investor, JEDI’s assets and liabilities should have been 
consolidated with Enron’s financial records. Nevertheless, Enron failed to consolidate the 
records, resulting in a significant retroactive reduction in the Enron’s reported net income and 
increase in its reported debt when transaction was reviewed in 2001 by the company and 
Arthur Andersen.165 
Enron’s handling of the Chewco transaction also stands as an example of Enron’s 
failed corporate governance and management oversight. Enron had a Code of Conduct of 
Business Affairs that would have required Kopper’s role as Chewco’s managing partner to be 
disclosed and approved by Enron’s Chairman and CEO before Enron could have transacted 
with Chewco.166 In other words, according to Enron’s internal processes, this sort of self-
dealing transaction had to be submitted to the Chairman and CEO to determine that the Enron 
employee’s participation in the other country would “not adversely affect the best interests of 
the Company.”167 Nevertheless, the Powers Report did not find evidence that Kenneth Lay, 
Enron’s Chairman and CEO at the time, knew of or approved of Kopper’s role in Chewco.168 
Enron had a clear internal policy that was not followed, resulting in management’s oversight 
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of a potentially problematic transaction that was most likely not in the company’s best 
interests.169 
2. The LJM Transactions 
 While Enron entered into the Chewco transaction without proper approval, some of 
the transactions the company entered into with Board approval nevertheless suffered from 
important accounting and governance defects. The company entered into business 
relationships with partnerships managed by Fastow (“LJM1” and “LJM2” or “LJM”) with the 
Board’s approval.170 Although clear conflicts of interest existed, the Board consented to the 
transactions and implemented a number of policies that it believed could control and mitigate 
the risks of such conflicted deals. For instance, all LJM transactions had to be reviewed and 
approved by the company’s Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Risk Officer, President and 
COO.171 The Audit and Compliance Committee also had to review all LJM transactions 
annually. While the processes were in place, the Board and Enron management failed to 
implement. The Powers Report found that the Chief Accounting Officer and Chief Risk 
Officer did not review the transactions with the scrutiny that the Board perhaps believed was 
occurring.172 Furthermore, while Jeffrey Skilling, the President and COO, represented to the 
Board that he was involved with reviewing the interested transactions, the Powers Report 
found that he provided nonexistent oversight over Enron’s transactions with Fastow.173 The 
Board, likewise, asked management few and only cursory questions regarding the 
transactions.174 Enron ultimately entered into over 20 transactions that could be generally 
categorized as “asset sales” or “hedging transactions” with these Fastow-managed 
partnerships between June 1999 and June 2001.175 
 Broadly speaking, the asset sales Enron entered into consisted of Enron transferring 
assets to the LJM partnerships in order to manipulate Enron’s bookkeeping. While such a 
transaction—which would remove the asset from Enron’s financial report—could be 
legitimate if the transacting party took on both the risks and benefits of owning the asset, 
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Enron, in at least several cases, agreed to protect LJM against loss.176 Adding to the 
questionable nature of the transactions, many of the assets were transferred back and forth 
between LJM and Enron in the months closely preceding and proceeding the company’s 
financial reporting period.177 LJM also made a profit on each of these back and forth 
transactions, regardless of whether the asset’s value had actually decreased.178 
 Like its questionable LJM asset sales transactions, the “hedging transactions” Enron 
entered into with the LJM partnerships were structured so that Enron could manipulate its 
bookkeeping. While a normal hedge involves reducing the risk in a particular transaction by 
entering into an agreement with a third party who takes on the economic risk of the value of 
the first transaction, the Enron-LJM hedges were more akin to a false equity swap. In the 
typical hedge, if the value of the investment decreases, the third party takes on the loss in 
value. Enron, however, funded SPEs with its own Enron stock with the LJM partnerships 
serving as the 3% outside equity holder required for non-consolidation.179 The SPEs served as 
Enron’s hedging partners. If the value of an Enron investment decreased, the hedging SPE 
would pay Enron for its losses with Enron’s own stock.180 This allowed Enron to cook its 
books: the company could record its hedging gains (the value paid to it by its hedging partner) 
against its investment losses in its financial statements. Because payment was with its own 
stock, however, Enron never actually decreased the economic risk of its investments. 
Importantly, these types of transactions were conducted with the approval of Arthur 
Andersen.181 When the markets declined in 2001, Enron could no longer cover its losses 
through creative accounting and had to announce in October 2001 a $544 million after-tax 
charge against earnings and reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 billion.182 
III. Enron as a Redesigned Corporation 
 While students of corporate law learn that the board of directors manages the company 
on the behalf of the shareholders, it is arguable how much “managing” a board actually 
engages in. It is well accepted at this point that many corporations have a management level 
that handles the day-to-day running of a corporation and that reports to the board. As much as 
a board “manages down” and guides the trajectory of a corporation by directing management, 
however, management equally “manages up” when it provides information that will shape 
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board decisions. Successful governance strategies—and by extension, a board’s success at 
managing a company—therefore depend largely on a board’s ability to obtain quality 
information it needs from management to assess the state of the corporation.  
Professor Robert E. Rosen suggests that certain “progressive” corporate 
organizations—including Enron—which he terms “redesigned corporations,” have 
characteristics that make them more susceptible to governance defects related to the board’s 
information gathering abilities.183 According to Rosen, in a redesigned corporation, projects 
are conceived and executed from the bottom-up, and the board monitors the corporation 
through analyzing risk management reports.184 As such, a board’s success depends on its 
ability to analyze the reports and probe for further information as necessary.185 Redesigned 
corporations also emphasize innovation, taking on high-risk, high reward projects, which 
require a board to properly mitigate risk.186 Rosen argues that distinctions between providers, 
suppliers and competitors are blurred in redesigned corporations. 187  In other words, a 
redesigned corporation integrates guest workers into its operations, creating a situation where 
an individual’s loyalty to another entity (e.g. the contracting agency) is a conflict of interest 
while the individual’s self-interest and entrepreneurialism within the redesigned corporation is 
rewarded.188 
 If one thinks about Enron as a redesigned corporation as Rosen suggests, it is possible 
to see how the company managed to conceal—or, for the board of directors, miss—its 
problematic accounting practices for so long. Enron was widely seen as one of the most 
innovative companies of its time—driven, perhaps, by the structure of its departments. 
Enron’s departments had a history of operating so independently from each other that they 
were referred to as “stand-alone silos”189 and a tolerance for group-driven projects. For 
instance, the company apparently invested $15 million (excluding salaries) into the Enron 
Online project before it occurred to the project’s team leader to inform management about the 
development of the project.190 Although Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s top 
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executives, were both reportedly “surprised” when they learned about Enron Online’s 
development,191 Enron Online would go on to be lauded as a success, averaging 6,000 
transactions worth about $2.5 billion each day two years after it launched.192 This sort of 
project development typifies how projects are developed in redesigned corporations and 
shows that management’s ability to direct the corporation relies heavily on receiving accurate, 
timely information from its project teams. As noted above, projects in a redesigned 
corporation are developed and presented to management. Management makes its decisions to 
green or red light projects based on its analysis of the project teams’ presentations. In a 
company with a culture of departments operating autonomously, there is little coordination 
between the departments. Instead, projects developed by the different departments compete 
for resources within the corporation by presenting compelling risk management plans to the 
executives. What executives do not know about, they cannot say no to. Furthermore, by the 
time management does learn about a project through a presentation or risk management plan, 
significant resources may have been poured into the project. 
 Given that a redesigned corporation relies on risk management reports to decide 
whether to pursue a particular project, the ability to reduce the risk of a project adds to its 
value. In line with the redesigned corporation model, which proposes that outside consultants 
and contractors are integrated into the company, Enron engaged professionals or consultants 
who added value to the company by working to reduce project risks—or perhaps gave the 
veneer of mitigated risks. Recall, for instance, that Arthur Andersen apparently approved the 
structure of the SPEs Enron formed with LJM funded with Enron stock.193 While one function 
of accountants is to provide third party verification and certification of a company’s audit 
(“gatekeeping”), accountants are also in the business of selling their services. In the 1990s, 
auditors found themselves operating in a period with low legal risk as auditors, owing to the 
combination of the Supreme Court’s Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertson and 
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate of Denver, N.A. decisions and the passage of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) and the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).194 Consequently, there might have been greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Id. 
192 Briony Hale, Enron’s Internet Monster, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1684503.stm. 
193 Powers Report, supra note 149 at 14. 
194 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 14 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. 
for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 207, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=325240. See 
also 501 U.S. 350, 359-61 (1991) (finding that litigation litigated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be instituted within one year after the discovery of the facts of the securities 
violation and within three years of said violation); 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (eliminating “aiding and abetting” 
27	  
	  
willingness on the part of the auditors to acquiesce to management decisions and give the 
gloss of certification as a hook to selling consulting services.195 Consulting fees were far more 
lucrative for auditors and made up the bulk of an auditor’s fees.196 As such, auditors like 
Arthur Andersen were motivated to “work for the client” in order to retain their consulting 
engagements.197 An auditor’s interest in remaining a consultant for a company thus turned it 
into a “yes man” unable to provide a fully independent assessment of the company’s project 
risks and accounting. This is, as Professor John C. Coffee terms it, “gatekeeper failure.”198 
Given that a decision in a redesigned corporation can only be as good as the information that 
was presented to management, inherently faulty information generated by interested parties 
can only result in inherently faulty decision making. 
 Viewed through the lens of the redesigned corporation model, Enron’s meltdown 
exposes at least several key corporate governance issues: the importance of (1) the board’s 
oversight power; (2) the board’s ability to obtain quality information about the risks of the 
company’s operations; and (3) the potential conflicts of interest arising from working too 
closely with auditors. 
IV. The U.S. Regulatory Response: Sarbanes-Oxley 
 In response to Enron and several other major accounting scandals in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “SOX” or the “Act”) in 2002.199 Aimed at restoring investor 
confidence in the United States capital markets, the Act introduced a number of regulatory 
reforms in accounting and in required corporate reporting that directly responded to some of 
the governance issues that plagued Enron.200 For instance, as a redesigned corporation, Enron 
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engaged in activities including creative accounting facilitated in partnership with its auditors, 
inaccurate disclosure of its financial picture that resulted in restatements that dramatically 
decreased shareholder equity,  
Sarbanes-Oxley introduced regulatory reform in the accounting profession, imposed 
additional disclosure and financial reporting responsibilities for corporations, created 
individual liability for top executives and gave stronger enforcement power to the SEC.201 
Incorporating lessons from Enron’s revealed corporate governance defects, Sarbanes-Oxley 
imposed regulations that could be thought of as “good practices” aimed at preventing 
governance problems. 
1. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and Auditor Independence and 
Accountability 
 One of Enron’s most striking governance defects was its gatekeeper failure. Enron’s 
auditor, Arthur Andersen, not only failed to catch the creative accounting that led to Enron’s 
collapse but also at times explicitly approved the company’s bookkeeping practices. As a 
response to preventing future gatekeeper failures, Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).202 The PCAOB, which is under SEC 
oversight,203 is a nonprofit corporation that regulates public accounting firms providing audit 
services. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, public accounting firms that prepare audits reports for 
securities issuers must register with PCAOB.204 The PCAOB promulgates auditing standards 
and has the power to investigate and discipline its members.205 
 Sarbanes-Oxley also took aim at auditor independence and accountability. Under 
SOX, auditors are now prohibited from providing non-audit (consulting) services 
contemporaneously to its audit client.206 Engagements with auditors for both auditing and 
consulting work must be pre-approved by a company’s audit committee, and approval of non-
audit consulting services must be disclosed to the company’s investors in periodic reports.207 
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SOX mandates that a securities issuer must rotate lead auditing firms every five fiscal 
years.208 SOX also requires auditors to present to the audit committee periodic reports on: 
“(1) All critical accounting policies and practices to be used; 
  (2) All alternative treatments of financial information within 
generally accepted accounting principles that have been 
discussed with management officials of the issuer, ramifications 
of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and the 
treatment preferred by the registered public accounting firm; 
and 
(3) Other material written communications between the 
registered public accounting firm and the management of the 
issuer, such as any management letter or schedule of unadjusted 
differences.”209 
This provision particularly responded to remedying the criticism leveled against the Enron 
Board for failure to probe into the company’s risky accounting practices.210 While an audit 
committee still has the duty to sufficiently investigate the state of the company’s accounting 
practices, SOX added a layer of accountability that makes it more likely than not that the 
committee receives such information. Taken together, these provisions within SOX were 
meant to facilitate the role of auditors as independent gatekeepers able to provide certification 
to parties like investors of the veracity of a company’s claimed finances. 
2. Corporate Responsibilities and Executive Liability 
While a board of directors has a fiduciary duty to provide oversight to a company’s 
activities,211 boards necessarily relies on management to handle the day-to-day running of a 
corporation and to accurately report back to the board. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act targets 
management’s reporting of accurate information by raising the stakes for executives of 
publicly traded companies. Under SOX, CEOs and CFOs must personally certify both 
financial and non-financial information filed with the SEC or risk criminal charges.212 By 
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imposing personal liability on the certifying corporate officer, SOX aligned the officer’s 
interest in self-preservation with the SEC’s public policy goals of protecting investors and 
maintaining efficient markets.213 This had the added benefit of recentralizing power to the 
board of directors—a defect that Enron, as a redesigned corporation, suffered from. The Act 
also required that companies maintain disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that 
information that needs to be disclosed and reported will be properly made public. 214 
According to the SEC, the combination of certification requirements and disclosure controls 
refocused executive attention on company disclosure responsibilities and the quality of the 
reporting.215 
 
 
 
3. Enhanced Corporate Disclosures 
 While securities issuers prior to Sarbanes-Oxley were required to report material 
information to the SEC in periodic disclosures,216 the Act instituted additional reporting 
requirements for these companies. One of the issues uncovered in Enron was that, while the 
interested transactions between Fastow’s LJM partnerships and Enron had in fact been 
included in SEC filings, the company had only obliquely included this information in the 
footnotes of its reports.217 For instance, in disclosing the LJM transactions in the company’s 
10-Q in the second quarter of 1999, Enron apparently noted that, “[a] senior officer of Enron 
is managing member of LJM’s general partner,” but failed to identify Fastow or detail how 
LJM or Fastow would be compensated.218 The Senate Report on Enron, echoing the Powers 
Report, found these indirect disclosures wholly inadequate.219 Sarbanes-Oxley thus imposed 
enhanced reporting responsibilities on securities issuers. For instance, off-balance sheet 
transactions, arrangements and obligations, and any other relationships that a company might 
have with unconsolidated entities or persons that may have a “material current or future effect 
on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results in operations, liquidity, capital 
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expenditures, capital resources or significant components of revenues or expenses” must now 
be clearly disclosed in a separately captioned subsection in the Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (“MD&A”) section of a 
company’s disclosure documents.220 The Act also imposed the disclosure of transactions 
involving management and principal stockholders.221 Additionally, the Act required that 
public companies disclose “on a rapid and current basis such additional information 
concerning material changes in financial condition or operations of the issuer” through Form 
8-K.222 Managers must also maintain and annually report “adequate control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting,” with the attestation of an auditor.223 
 In addition to obligating corporations with increased financial reporting, Sarbanes-
Oxley also required that corporations disclose information about corporate codes of ethics and 
audit committee financial experts. 224  The SEC adopted “adopt or explain” policies in 
implementing these sections of the statute. A corporation must disclose whether it (1) has an 
audit committee; (2) if the audit committee has an “audit committee financial expert”; (3) the 
name of the expert; and (4) whether the expert is independent of management.225 If the 
corporation that does not have an expert, it must explain why. Similarly, a corporation must 
disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics that applies to the company’s executives.226 
The company must explain why if it has not adopted a code, whether any amendments have 
been made to its code, or if any of its officers has waived out of the code.227  
V. Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, the Act was criticized across corporate 
America because of its high cost of implementation and compliance and questionable benefit 
toward enhancing the U.S. markets.228 Even ten years after its enactment, the argument over 
the cost-benefit the Act had yet to subside.229 Empirical studies on the economic cost of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rule to Implement Sarbanes-Oxley Act Reforms 
(Oct. 30, 2002), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-155.htm. 
221 Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 788. 
222 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchn. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules on Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 
15, 2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-6.htm.  
223 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT PERIODIC REPORTS, RELEASE NOS. 33-8238 
(Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm. 
224 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264, 7265. 
225 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 406 AND 407 OF THE SARBANES OXLEY 
ACT OF 2002, RELEASE NOS. 33-8177 (MAR. 27, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 A Price Worth  Paying?, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/3984019. 
229 For instance, Steven Barth, a partner at Foley & Lardner, called it an “abject failure. If the goal and object of 
Sarbanes-Oxley was to create more confidence in our capital markets, let’s face it: it can’t prevent fraud and 
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implementing Sarbanes-Oxley have found that the Act’s reporting and compliance 
requirements caused significant cash flow declines at the firm level, some of which can be 
traced to managerial diversion.230 Yet those requirements have also become, to an accepted 
cost to doing business with some positive effects. For instance, voluntary disclosure of certain 
information by corporations increased after the passage of SOX.231 Elements of the legislation 
have become accepted as “good practice” even outside public companies, particularly with 
regard to independence and the restructuring of financial committees.232 And, in 2009, Audit 
Analytics published a study that found a 46% higher rate of financial restatements for 
companies that did not comply with SOX’s internal control provisions.233 While it can be 
argued that Sarbanes-Oxley treated only the symptoms that led to the Enron collapse, if one 
believes that efficient markets requires certain types of information about corporations, 
Sarbanes-Oxley refocused corporate attention to making those types of disclosure, and in that 
sense, can be seen as successful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abuse from occurring. Has the stock market become more trustworthy over the past 10 years?” Melissa Maleske, 
Eight Ways SOX Changed Corporate Governance, INSIDE COUNSEL (Jan. 1, 2012), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/01/01/8-ways-sox-changed-corporate-governance. 
230 See e.g. Anwer S. Ahmed, Mary Lea McAnally, Stephanie Rasmussen, Connie D. Weaver, How costly is the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the effects of the Act on corporate profitability, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 503 (2010) 
(finding that average cash flows delcine by 1.3% of total assets after SOX came into effect).  
231 Lawrence A. Gordon, Martin P. Loeb, William Lucyshyn, Tashfeen Sohail, The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act on the corporate disclosures of information security activities, 25 J. ACCT. PUB. POL’Y 503 (2006). 
232 Rick Cohen, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ten Years Later, NONPROFIT Q. (Dec. 30, 2012), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2012/12/30/sarbanes-oxley-ten-years-later/. 
233 Ernst & Young, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act at 10 (2012). 
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D. Comparing Enron and Siemens 
 
I. Corporate Misconduct: Divergent Outcomes 
The Enron and Siemens scandals have been widely cited as examples of egregious 
corporate misconduct in the last 20 years. While the misconduct at Enron and Siemens may 
not be directly comparable (accounting irregularities and bribery, respectively), both 
companies had engaged in activities that were arguably characteristic of peer companies in 
their respective countries and markets and had corporate cultures that acknowledged yet 
subverted internal controls.234 Yet the regulatory and economic resolutions of the companies’ 
respective misconduct were dramatically different: Enron ceased to exist while Siemens 
continues to be a major international corporation.235 These differences in outcome may be 
attributable to the varying corporate traditions and regulatory structures. Furthermore, while 
Enron’s value was tied to its reputation as being on the cutting edge of energy and energy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 See Clinton Free, Norman Macintosh & Mitchell Stein, Management Controls: The Organizational Fraud 
Triangle of Leadership, Culture and Control in Enron, IVEY BUSINESS J. (Jul. 2007), 
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/management-controls-the-organizational-fraud-triangle-of-
leadership-culture-and-control-in-enron/ (arguing that Enron CEO Jeff Skilling introduced a corporate culture 
that resulted in the disregard of internal controls); and Samuel Rubenfeld, Siemens CFO: Our Internal Control 
System Works Like a Charm, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2013), http://on.wsj.com/X1zilc (noting cultural changes 
made to Siemens’ corporate compliance culture following the company’s FCPA fine). 
235 The individual penalties imposed on key figures within their respective corporations also differed. Enron 
CEO Jeffrey Skilling was sentenced to over two decades in prison in the U.S., while Siemens CEO Heinrich von 
Pierer was fined 5 million euros. 
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markets, Siemens value was associated with tangible products and engineering, which may 
have contributed to the difference in outcomes. 
The 2001 collapse of the Texas-based energy company Enron resulted in the 
remarkably expedient passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 because accounting 
scandals of its ilk threatened investor trust in the capital markets.236 Enron had issued 
financial restatements related to Enron’s off-the-book transactions with SPEs that 
dramatically reduced shareholder equity and ultimately resulted in the company’s bankruptcy 
and collapse. Although off-balance-sheet transactions with SPEs were not per se illegal,237 the 
company engaged in questionable accounting with regard to consolidating these transactions 
into its financial statements, which resulted in overstating the company’s value. When the 
company was forced to issue restatements of its financial reports, it projected instability and 
unreliability to investors. For a company whose lifeblood depended on being at the cutting 
edge, instability apart from the inherent risks of technological innovation could be—and 
was—fatal. As such, Enron’s demise can be linked to shaken investor trust in the company. 
SOX, which directly addressed many of the practices that led to Enron’s downfall and 
introduced regulation into the accounting industry, was clearly a reactionary piece of 
legislation aimed at preventing this type of instability in the future. The political climate at the 
time of its passage was ripe for such a piece of legislation, given the number of other 
accounting scandals that had come to light in the late 1990s and early 2000s.238 Furthermore, 
the legislation was rationally consistent with the SEC’s policy of protecting investors and 
maintaining efficient markets through information disclosure.239  
 SOX’s swift enactment in the United States as a response to the accounting and 
governance practices that led to Enron’s downfall stands in contrast to Germany’s regulatory 
response to the discovery of Siemens’ bribery scandal. Regulators discovered Siemens’ 
bribery practices in 2003, and it did not become public until 2006 when German police raided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 The bill that led to Sarbanes-Oxley was introduced into the House of Representatives on February 14, 2002. It 
passed both the House and the Senate by July 15, 2002 and was signed into law by President George W. Bush on 
July 30, 2002. Bill Summary & Status http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03763:@@@S. 
237 Off-balance-sheet transactions are frequently—and legitimately—used by companies to manage risk or take 
advantage of tax minimization opportunities. For instance, a corporation might structure a lease as an 
“operating” lease, which allows for a company to pay for the use of an asset over a period of time, exclude the 
asset and related obligations from its balance sheet and show lease payments on its income statement as a rent 
expense. See e.g. Transferring Risks Off of the Balance Sheet and the Income Statement, CENTER FOR FINANCIAL 
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, INC. (Feb. 19, 2002), available at 
http://faculty.babson.edu/halsey/acc7500/Off%20balance-sheet%20financing%20-%20transferring%20risk.pdf. 
238 These include Waste Management (1998), Enron (2001), Tyco International (2002), Adelphia (2002), 
Peregrine Systems (2002) and WorldCom (2002). 
239 See supra note 213. 
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the company’s offices.240 Yet it was not until November 2015 that Germany enacted new laws 
directed against corruption despite attempts in 2006 to pass similar legislation.241 Although 
bribery had technically been illegal in Germany for several years,242 the country had formerly 
had a tradition of tolerating corporate bribery. For instance, up until 1999, bribes of foreign 
officials—or as Siemens referred to them, nützliche Aufwendungen or “useful money”—were 
considered tax-deductible business expenses under the German tax code.243 In 2006, Daimler 
AG was discovered to have bribed officials in countries including Russia, China and 
Turkistan.244 Even Deutsche Bahn AG, a private railway corporation owned by the German 
government, has engaged in bribery, reportedly bribing Greek officials to win a railway 
contract for the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.245 It is possible that this former tradition of 
paying “useful money” contributed to Germany’s slow embrace of additional anti-corruption 
enforcement and sanctions post-Siemens. Although the Siemens scandal was discovered 
several years after Germany outlawed corporate bribery, one could surmise that social 
attitudes toward bribery were in a state of flux, and that, given the relative newness of the 
1999 legislation at that time, German regulators adopted a wait and see approach to 
evaluating the effects of those regulatory changes. 
Given the German regulatory landscape, the Siemens scandal certainly would not have 
progressed to the degree it did but for the fact that Siemens had been listed on the NYSE246 
and therefore subject to SEC reporting requirements and the United States’ Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA).247 Key to Siemens’ cooperation in investigating the extent of its 
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241 See Joachim Kaetzler and Hannes Ronken, The New German Anticorruption Law, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8df6e411-77b5-4a6e-842a-ced0db740a9e (describing the 
changes to anti-corruption law in Germany introduced by the enactment of Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Korruption in 2015). 
242 See supra Section B.III.2. 
243 Siri Schubert and T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html. 
244 Dietmar Hawranek, Useful Payments: US Investigators Crack Down on Daimler’s Culture of Corruption, 
SPIEGEL (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/useful-payments-us-investigators-crack-
down-on-daimler-s-culture-of-corruption-a-686238.html. 
245 Jörg Schmitt, Complicit in Corruption: How German Companies Bribed Their Way to Greek Deals, SPIEGEL 
(May 11, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/complicit-in-corruption-how-german-companies-
bribed-their-way-to-greek-deals-a-693973.html. 
246 Siemens delisted from the NYSE in May 2014. NYSE Delisting FAQs, SIEMENS AG (May 2014), available at 
http://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/en/investor_relations/delisting_faq_en.pdf. 
247 One can muse about whether “corporate governance” can be characterized as a set of norms and best practices 
for corporations, and a company’s “best” set of practices depends on its particular jurisdiction and the regulatory 
framework within which it operates. Given German tolerance for useful money, application of the FCPA, which 
is based on the U.S.’s policy toward bribery, arguably put Siemens in the middle of a clash of cultures.  
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bribery practices was that it risked exclusion from public procurement contracts.248 In 2004, 
the European Union (EU) issued Directive 2004/18/EC (the “Directive”), which set out, 
among other requirements, rules for participating in EU public procurement processes for 
contracts over a certain value and requirements.249 The Directive included a particularly 
significant provision for Siemens as it faced charges under the FCPA: Article 45. Under 
Article 45, contractors who have been convicted of (1) participating in a criminal 
organization, (2) corruption, (3) fraud, or (4) money laundering are mandatorily excluded 
from participating in a public contract.250 While Siemens, as a corporation, did not risk 
conviction in Germany,251 it risked a conviction under the FCPA as a result of its listing on 
the NYSE, which could have resulted in mandatory debarment from public contracts in the 
EU under Article 45.252 
The threat of debarment stemming from an FCPA conviction faced by Siemens may 
very well have been the company’s saving grace. As a major international public contractor, 
Siemens’ value as a company could be tied to the value of the various contracts it had 
procured. Additionally, it had a number of other assets with inherent physical or hard value. 
253 Siemens is also a conglomerate, with subsidiaries throughout the world. In charging 
Siemens with violations of the FCPA, the SEC and the DOJ in fact charged Siemens AG (the 
parent company) with violating the internal controls and books and records provisions of the 
FCPA and Siemens Venezuela and Siemens Bangladesh (subsidiaries) under the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA.254 This allowed Siemens to isolate liability and avoid Siemens AG’s 
mandatory debarment under the Directive.255  
Taken together, it may be that Siemens’ survival as a company could be predicated on 
several key factors: (1) the company had diversified assets that could be tied to hard value; (2) 
the GCC could not hold corporate entities criminally guilty; and (3) the statutory frameworks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Eric Lichtblau and Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2008), 
http://nyti.ms/1JnHnzG. 
249 Peter B. Clark & Jennifer A. Suprenant, Siemens—Potential Interplay of FCPA Charges and Mandatory 
Debarment Under the Public Procurement Directive of the European Union, 2009 ABA NAT’L INST. ON WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME (San Francisco, Mar. 5-6, 2009), available at 
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250 Id. 
251 See supra Section III.3.a.aa. 
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254 Peter B. Clark & Jennifer A. Suprenant, supra note 249. 
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Since they presumably did no business in the EU, they would be relatively unaffected by the Directive’s 
debarment. The United States extracted its pound of flesh, and Siemens AG could go about its business. 
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of the FCPA and the Directive allowed the company to isolate liability. This is in contrast to 
Enron, whose assets were tied to soft value—trading on commodities, derivatives and investor 
confidence—and the structure of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which imposes 
liability on a single public issuer. 
 
II. Comparative Regulatory Responses 
In the following the law and the reaction shall be compared. 
 
1. The U.S. Regulatory Response vs. the German “Response” 
Although the managerial conduct in Enron and Siemens may not directly comparable, 
this section will attempt to compare the relevant regulatory responses in the United States and 
Germany. Enron was one of several accounting scandals that occurred within a very short 
period of time in the U.S. Viewed as one of a series of like scandals, including Waste 
Management and WorldCom, the Enron case can be seen as the straw that broke the camel’s 
back and prompted the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Siemens scandal, however, did not 
prompt any quick legislative changes, even though there were similar corruption scandals 
around the same time, including MAN, Daimler, Telekom or Volkswagen. In particular, 
bribery revelations at Volkswagen tainted the image of Germany’s corporate institutions in 
2005. Volkswagen managers had used company funds to buy the support of labor 
representatives with sex parties, holidays with prostitutes and cash bonuses.256 This scandal 
was likely more embarrassing than the comparatively demure Siemens affair and struck the 
heart of German integrity. To understand why Germany did not respond immediately to the 
Siemens scandal with any quick legislative changes, while the United States immediately 
passed Sarbanes-Oxley, this section will compare the landscapes of both legal regimes prior 
to and post scandals. 
Prior to the Siemens scandal, German regulators had made some legislative changes 
toward quashing corruption.257 As mentioned above258, the current German policy regarding 
bribery is the result of a gradual process. The decisive change happened in 1998 when the 
bribery of foreign officials became a crime in Germany. Prior to this change, only the bribery 
of Germany’s own national officials was usually punished. The bribery of foreign officials 
was common practice and used as legitimate means to acquire public orders abroad. After the 
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257 Siemens-Korruptionsaffäre brodelt weiter. 
258 See “Legal situation in Germany”, 12-15. 
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scandal, the German legislators tried to continue to improve the regulations, but not directly in 
answer to the corruption scandal. It took a while to reach the current legal situation to better 
combating corruption in Germany.  In contrast, the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977. 
America on the other hand did not have a sufficient legal and regulatory structure 
relating to accounting rules. The former laws and SEC regulations allowed firms, for instance, 
to provide consulting services to a company and then turn around and provide the audited 
report concerning the financial results of these consulting activities. This resulted in a conflict 
of interest that was built into the American legal structure. 259  Sarbanes-Oxley placed 
restrictions on some of these activities. SOX also increased corporate compliance costs for 
companies listed in the United States relative to costs for companies registered only on 
foreign exchanges. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act moved the American system of corporations, 
which had been more based on self-regulation, toward increasing governmental regulation.260  
Another reason why Germany may not have immediately passed laws targeting 
corruption could be that the Siemens scandal was resolved in a relatively timely manner 
(2006-2008). Siemens cooperated with both German and American authorities. Siemens also 
agreed to establish a compliance system under the supervision of an independent compliance 
monitor who would make regular reports to the DOJ. As such, unlike in Enron, there was no 
real necessity for the immediate regulatory intervention by the native legislators. In other 
words, Germany had a workable corporate code that addressed bribery—Siemens merely had 
a corporate culture of ignoring said code.261 
Concluding, it can be noted that the reactions to the scandals were different in terms of 
their rapidity and outcome. Perhaps, also, the German disposition of skepticism towards knee-
jerk legislative changes contributed to the reluctance around political reform. Germans are 
rather afraid of quick legislative changes and prefer gradual reforms. 
 
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the consequences for 
German Corporations 
Since the 16th of May 2014,262 Siemens is no longer listed on the American Stock 
exchange, and as such, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act no longer applies. To understand this 
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260 Wymeersch, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/v. Werder, Handbuch Corporate Governance, 156. 
261 The American student in this team will wonder why, if the GCGC was so “workable,” did no one think to 
revise it if there was rampant bribery? 
262 Delisting New York Stock Exchange, 1. 
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decision, it is important to examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on German firms, and to compare the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with 
German regulations such as AktG to see whether the requirements of the respective 
regulations are congruent or not.  
In general, the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act meant that the corporations 
that are issuers in the United States were faced with new requirements in the area of 
Corporate Governance. Of particular importance are sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. They address the internal control system of a company and prescribe which 
changes have to be considered. If the regulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are to be 
compared with the Germany’s regulation, it can be concluded that they go well beyond the 
German applicable legal provisions. It punishes infringements that under German law would 
be considered unpunished erroneous entries (“Fehlbuchung or Führen falscher Bücher”).263 
Further, according to §§ 242 until 245 i.c.w. § 264 of the commercial code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch; abbr.: HGB264), the German executive board is obliged to set up and 
sign the annual financial statement. This shall be used to determine whether the financial data 
in the annual financial statement is correct and complete. Almost the same can be said for 
section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which regulates the establishment of disclosure 
controls and procedures. Both, CEO and CFO, have the duty to confirm in writing the 
disclosure controls and procedures. In cases of any infringement of these rules however, the 
penalties differ. The penalties in America can reach, for example, an imprisonment of 20 
years,265 whereas an imprisonment of up to 5 years “only” is possible according to § 332 
HGB in Germany. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires the firms to 
establish an intensive internal control system and external assessment, also adds to the costs 
of compliance in the United States.266  
Like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) also imposed 
compliance requirements on corporations. It is a law designed to fight against corruption, and 
is enforced by the SEC and the Department of Justice. It is applicable to all corporations that 
are listed on the American stock exchange (even foreign ones such as Siemens) and to legal or 
natural persons that have any contact with America.267 As such, it is far broader than the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The FCPA is divided into two parts, anti-corruption regulations and 
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books and records. The law forbids, among other acts, acts of bribery of foreign officials. 
Unlike §§ 331 ff. StGB, the FCPA is punishing only the donor’s side (Bestechung) and not 
the recipient’s side (Bestechlichkeit).268 Non-observance of the FCPA can lead to serious 
economic and criminal consequences for the enterprises.269 Unlike Germany, which does not 
have the concept of corporate crime, corporations can be held criminally liable in America. 
Corporations can receive a fine of up to 2 million USD for each relevant violation of the bribe 
regulation. Natural persons are threatened with a penalty up to $100,000 USD per violation 
and imprisonment for 5 years, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff(c). Even more drastic 
are the fines which are possible according to 15 U.S.C. § ff(a) if the legal obligation to keep 
records is intentionally infringed. Corporations can be fined up to $24 million USD per 
infringing act, and natural person can be called to account for up to $5 million USD and 
imprisonment for 20 years. In Germany, according to § 283b StGB, the fine is much less: 2 
years of imprisonment or a fine. The range of sentences shows what a “powerful weapon” the 
FCPA in the hands of the U.S. authorities can be. 
Taken together, the enforcement of the FCPA and Sarbanes-Oxley Act show a 
fundamental difference between United States and German law. The United States has 
adopted a relatively aggressive scheme of enforcement that holds both corporate entities and 
individuals liable for misconduct. In contrast, German law does not have the concept of 
corporate crime and focuses on the criminality of the individual and imposes relatively less 
onerous sanctions on infringers. 
 
III. The Effect of Enron and Siemens on Subsequent Corporate Practices 
 Enron and Siemens have each influenced how corporations manage their internal 
processes and interact with regulatory systems. Enron exposed how even the best of 
monitoring systems may fail, whether through the self-interested actions of managers, 
corporate culture or over-reliance on gatekeepers. Although Enron and Siemens involved 
different problems—accounting and bribery, respectively—the net effect of each has been a 
refocusing of managerial and regulatory attentions on monitoring and preventing those 
substantive issues. For instance, SOX introduced mandatory accounting controls, and the 
years since the Act’s passage have not yet yielded any accounting scandals comparable to the 
scale of Enron or WorldCom. Enron, interestingly, may have had an effect on FCPA 
prosecution, which Siemens benefited from. Siemens, meanwhile, sparked renewed 
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international interest in preventing corporate bribery and set the standard for future internal 
investigations and deferred prosecution agreements. 
 
1. Enron’s Effect on Monitoring and the FCPA 
 Given that SOX’s passage preceded the discovery of Siemens’ U.S. prosecution, one 
might surmise that its emphasis on the presence of internal controls may have also had an 
effect on FCPA prosecution. The FCPA, which was passed in 1977 and has accounting 
control requirements like SOX, had been relatively unenforced until after the passage of 
SOX.270 Beginning in 2002, there has been an upward trend in FCPA actions brought by the 
DOJ and SEC alike.271 This increase in enforcement has coincided with an increase in self-
reporting by companies of potential FCPA violations. 272  Trends have indicated that 
companies that self-report potential violations and cooperate with the SEC and DOJ may be 
able to resolve FCPA charges with more favorable outcomes like a deferred prosecution 
agreement (DPA).273 The prospect of a less onerous sanction in the event of a charge 
underscores SOX’s emphasis on internal controls and incentivizes companies to focus more 
resources to its compliance programs. 
Enron may have also contributed to the increased use of DPAs and other alternative 
non-prosecution agreements as a means to resolving corporate criminal charges. Enron’s 
auditor Arthur Andersen had been one of accounting’s Big Five.274 In the aftermath of Enron, 
Andersen was convicted of a felony count of obstructing an official government proceeding, 
which barred the firm from auditing financial statements for issuers.275 For an auditing firm, 
this arguably was like an execution sentence. While the conviction was later vacated by the 
Supreme Court,276 Andersen’s business cratered (the “Andersen Effect”),277 turning the Big 
Five into the Big Four. Some have argued that Andersen’s destruction shows how the 
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conviction of a major corporation can have huge collateral consequences and that the rise of 
DPAs and other non-prosecution agreements is correlated to preventing a repeat of the 
Andersen Effect.278 The structure of the Siemens conviction is consistent with this policy of 
preventing collateral damage. Siemens cooperated with authorities, launching a massive 
internal investigation279—a move that has since become de rigueur for companies under 
investigation.280 Ultimately, Siemens AG pleaded guilty to accounting charges, while two of 
its subsidiaries in non-European countries pleaded guilty to bribery charges. 281  This 
partitioning of culpability allowed Siemens to maintain its public contracts in Europe. It is 
entirely imaginable that the existence of Siemens would have been majorly threatened if the 
parent company were barred from public contracts. Thus, Siemens arguably benefited from 
one of the effects that Enron had on corporate investigations. 
 
2. Siemens’ Effect on Anti-Bribery Regulation 
 In the years since Siemens, there has been an increased international focus on 
corporate bribery at an international level. For instance, the United Kingdom introduced 
changes to its bribery laws with the enactment of the Bribery Act in 2010.282 Even China 
announced an anti-corruption campaign 283 —and actually brought charges against 
GlaxoSmithKline for bribing non-government officials.284 Efforts in Europe, particularly by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to establish anti-
bribery regulations have also increased. For instance, the OECD recommended against the 
bribery of foreign officials in 2009.285 This would seem to indicate that in the last two 
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decades, there has been a change in global societal attitudes toward the appropriateness of 
corporate bribery.  
Germany also recently introduced changes in its Corporate Governance Code targeting 
bribery. The Code was subject to major amendments in 2007 as the international 
developments raised corporate governance questions concerning the management board.286 
Also in the following years the Code has continuously been modified. But since the Code 
does not really provide Anti-Bribery Regulations, the Siemens case seems not to have 
affected the Corporate Governance Code. Especially the non-binding nature of the Code is 
being seen skeptical. As illustrated above287 criminal regulations undertook some changes but 
not directly as a result of the Siemens scandal. Last year though, on the 26th of November 
2015288, the law on combating corruption came into force and substantially changed the 
corruption criminal law.289 In particular the new amendment in § 299 StGB states that not 
only the unfair preference in competition (unlautere Bevorzugung im Wettbewerb) is 
punishable, but also the simple infringement towards the principal (Geschäfstherr). Therefore, 
the scope of commercial bribery in German Criminal law has been expanded.290 It probably 
cannot be seen as a direct result of the Siemens scandal, but nevertheless a step in the right 
direction has been made. It can be criticized though that the Corporate Governance system 
and the anticorruption efforts in German companies in general tend to take a reactive 
approach. 
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E. Conclusion 
“Corporations are not individuals, and they cannot simply choose to obey the law.”291 
Rather, it is the responsibility of the people who make up the organization to implement 
internal checks and processes that can maintain investor trust and are consistent with 
applicable governmental regulations. Our review of Enron and Siemens shows that in both 
cases, there was a common pattern of underlying behavior: a company chasing strategic 
opportunities, facing competition and under financial pressure may engage in questionable 
behavior that at the ex ante stage seemed reasonable. What started as a “one-shot deal” to 
meet short-term financial expectations or performance metrics may escalate to what is, in the 
ex post, fraudulent activity. Furthermore, this behavior may escape the attention of auditors, 
well-intentioned boards of directors and careful stakeholders until it is too late. 
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What is striking is the variety of corporate governance approaches to addressing the 
various iterations of problematic corporate behavior driven by this underlying theme. 
Corporate governance failures can be costly and take years to resolve. But what constitutes 
“good” corporate governance seems to be an ever-evolving concept inspired by ex post 
analyses of corporate meltdowns. For instance, the Enron accounting scandal revealed the 
potential pitfalls of a redesigned corporation aggressively chasing new opportunities and 
profits. Ex post analysis has emphasized the importance of management attention on internal 
risk management and the potential liabilities of overly relying on gatekeepers whose interests 
may not be necessarily aligned with those of the corporation. The Siemens bribery scandal, 
meanwhile, showed how a German corporation, operating in the tradition of German 
corporate governance, became subject to foreign expectations of proper corporate practice and 
accordingly adopted new “best practices.” Taken together, it seems essential for corporations 
to invest proactively in implementing organizational systems that support and encourage 
conduct that is consistent with and balances (1) the company’s norms and cultural values that 
guide the managers’ behaviors and decision making on a daily basis; and (2) the company’s 
obligations to domestic and foreign jurisdictions.  
